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Abstract
This paper examines the economic and environmental implications of biomass commer-
cialization; that is, converting organic waste into a saleable product, from the perspec-
tive of an agri-processor that uses a commodity input to produce both a commodity
output and biomass. We characterize the economic value and perform sensitivity anal-
ysis to investigate how spot price uncertainty affects this value. We find that commer-
cializing biomass makes the profits more resilient to changes in spot price uncertainty.
To examine the environmental implications, we characterize the expected carbon emis-
sions considering the profit-maximizing operational decisions. In comparison with the
perception in practice, which fails to consider the changes in operational decisions after
commercialization, we identify two types of misconceptions (and characterize condi-
tions under which they appear). In particular, the processor would mistakenly think
that commercializing its biomass is environmentally beneficial when it is not, and vice
versa. Using a model calibration, we show that the former misconception is likely to
be observed in the palm industry. We perform sensitivity analyses to investigate how
a higher biomass price or demand (which is always economically superior) affects the
environmental assessment and characterize conditions under which these changes are
environmentally superior or inferior. Based on our results, we put forward important
practical implications that are of relevance to both agri-processors and policy makers.
Keywords: Biomass, Agriculture, Commodity, Sustainability, Emissions, Spot Price
Uncertainty, Renewable Energy, Palm Oil
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1 Introduction
Global warming and climate change have created an unprecedented interest in reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally, especially in energy production (Ko¨k et al. 2016).
Biomass (i.e., organic matter), a renewable energy source, plays a pivotal role in achieving
this objective as it can be used as a feedstock in a bioenergy plant replacing fossil fuels to
produce energy (e.g., heat, electricity).1 Our focus in this paper is on agricultural residues
as biomass source. In several agricultural industries, including the oilseed industry (e.g.,
palm, coconut) and the sugar industry, processors convert their residues (e.g., kernel shell
for the oilseed industry and bagasse for the sugar industry) into a saleable product and
sell it to bioenergy plants. Commercializing agricultural residues is gaining momentum due
to increasingly strict standards for renewable energy usage across the globe. For example,
as seen in Table 7 of the U.S. Department of Agriculture report (USDA 2018), Japan’s
import of palm kernel shells has increased nearly by ten-fold since 2013, to more than 1.13
million metric tons in 2017. This volume accounts for approximately US$125 million and
according to the same report, it is expected to increase further in the near future as a result
of Japan’s target of providing at least 22% of its energy needs through renewable sources
by 2030. Significant import volumes of palm kernel shells are also reported by several
other countries, including South Korea and the U.S. (Jakarta Post 2017). Increasing trend
for biomass commercialization is also observed in other agricultural processing industries
(see Pearson 2016). These recent developments give rise to a need for processors to better
understand the economic and environmental implications of commercializing their biomass.
On the economic implications, there is a nascent operations management literature that
studies the value of converting waste stream into a saleable product albeit in the context of
other waste streams such as municipal waste (Ata et al. 2012) and excess fresh produce (Lee
and Tongarlak 2017). The knowledge base developed in these papers is not directly appli-
cable to the context of agricultural residue because agricultural processors feature unique
operational characteristics. Consider, for example, the palm industry. Palm oil mills pro-
duce crude palm oil (a commodity output) and palm kernel shell (biomass) from fresh fruit
palm bunches (a commodity input). As both the input and the output are commodities, the
processors are exposed to prevailing spot prices in buying and selling these commodities and
1Among all the renewable energy sources (e.g., wind, solar) energy produced from biomass has the largest
share—50% in 2017—in the global renewable energy consumption (International Energy Agency 2018).
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these prices exhibit considerable variability (Boyabatlı et al. 2017). Moreover, to counteract
against spot price variability, palm oil mills rely on long-term contracts for procurement,
as commonly observed in commodity processing industries (Boyabatlı 2015). These unique
operational characteristics play critical roles in the economic implications of biomass com-
mercialization. In summary, to our knowledge there is no work that studies the value of
biomass commercialization for the agricultural processor. Therefore, there is also no work
that examines the effect of key factors (e.g., spot price uncertainty) on this value. Our first
research objective is to fill this void.
On the environmental implications, the common perception in practice is that converting
waste into a saleable product is environmentally beneficial because it leads to a reduction
in GHG emissions owing to lower landfill and replacement of fossil fuel energy source in
downstream power plant (Ata et al. 2012). This common perception has been one of the key
driving forces behind the increasing popularity of biomass commercialization in agricultural
processing industries (see, for example, Pearson 2016). A stream of papers in the industrial
ecology literature has refined this perception by highlighting that biomass commercialization
requires additional processing (e.g., de-fibring) and transportation activities which may
create significant emissions (Iakovou et al. 2010). Although these papers provide a detailed
environmental analysis, as also highlighted by Lee (2012), they do not take into account
the optimization of operational decisions. Therefore, they fail to incorporate the emissions
resulting from the changes in operational decisions (e.g., input processing and procurement
volumes, production volumes for each output including biomass) after commercialization. In
summary, it is an open question under which conditions the processor can justifiably claim
that commercializing its biomass is environmentally beneficial. Moreover, it is also an open
question how the environmental assessment is affected by biomass market characteristics.
Our second research objective is to develop this knowledge base.
To achieve these objectives, we propose a two-stage model that—in a stylized manner—
captures the important operational characteristics of an agri-processor that commercializes
its biomass. This model is motivated by our interactions with a coconut processor who
aims to commercialize its coconut kernel shell. The firm (processor) procures a single input
commodity and sells an output commodity and biomass in a single period to maximize its
expected profit. The firm has two sources for input procurement, a contract and an input
spot market. The output can be sold to two channels, an output spot market and demand
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that is characterized by a fixed-price fixed-volume sales contract. The output can also be
procured from the spot market to satisfy the demand. The biomass is sold to demand
that is characterized by a similar sales contract. In the first stage, the firm chooses the
input contract volume to be reserved in the face of the input and the output spot price
uncertainties. In the second stage, after these uncertainties are realized the firm decides
the quantity to source from the reserved contract volume and the input spot market, the
processing volume, the quantity to source from the output spot market, and the quantity
of output demand and biomass demand to satisfy.
To delineate the economic and environmental implications of biomass commercialization,
we make a comparison with a benchmark model in which the firm sells only the output
commodity and biomass goes to landfill. We complement our structural analysis with
numerical analysis based on realistic instances. To this end, we calibrate our model to
represent a typical palm oil mill located in Malaysia (which accounts for 28.1% of world palm
oil production in 2018 (USDA 2019)). We use publicly available data from the Malaysian
Palm Oil Board, complemented by the data obtained from the extant literature. Our main
findings can be summarized as follows.
Economic Implications. The value of biomass commercialization is given by the dif-
ference between the optimal expected profit after commercialization and the same before
commercialization. We show that this value can be characterized by the product of biomass
demand and an expected biomass margin which captures the effects of spot price uncertainty
and firm’s optimal decisions. Common intuition may suggest that this expected biomass
margin can be characterized based on two possibilities on the spot day before commercial-
ization: processing is profitable so that waste stream is already available for conversion to a
saleable product (which brings a margin of biomass price) and processing is not profitable
so that there is no waste stream, and hence, no conversion (which brings zero margin). We
provide specific conditions under which this intuition holds and extend it by showcasing a
third possibility in which processing becomes profitable only after commercialization. More
interestingly, we show that when the firm increases its contract procurement volume after
commercialization, the biomass margin on the day can become negative or even larger than
the biomass price. These results underline the need for conducting a formal analysis in
evaluating the value of biomass commercialization.
We conduct sensitivity analyses, both analytically and numerically, to investigate the
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effects of correlation between input and output spot prices and their respective variability
on the value of biomass commercialization. We find that a higher correlation is always
beneficial; that is, it increases this value, but a higher (input or output) spot price variability
is beneficial only when this variability is low; otherwise, a lower spot price variability is
beneficial. The general insight from the literature (see, Plambeck and Taylor 2013 and
Boyabatlı et al. 2017) is that a processor’s profitability (before and after commercialization)
decreases in spot price correlation and decreases (increases) in input or output spot price
variability when this variability is sufficiently low (high). Our results indicate that whenever
the change in spot price uncertainty has an unfavorable (a favorable) impact on profitability,
commercializing biomass reduces this negative (positive) impact. The main takeaway is that
biomass commercialization, besides creating a new revenue stream for the processor, makes
the processor’s profits more resilient to changes in spot price uncertainty.
Environmental Implications. To measure the environmental impact we use total ex-
pected carbon emissions—including procurement-, processing-, selling-, and landfill-related
emissions—resulting from profit-maximizing operational decisions before and after biomass
commercialization. The processor can justifiably claim that commercializing its biomass is
environmentally beneficial when the total expected emissions are lower after commercializa-
tion. We show that when the changes in operational decisions are ignored, our assessment
is consistent with the common perception in practice: commercialization is environmentally
beneficial when the landfill emission intensity is higher than the biomass selling emission
intensity—which is given by the unit emission associated with additional (processing, trans-
portation, and burning) activities less the unit emission saving obtained by burning biomass
instead of fossil fuel. However, when the changes in operational decisions are not ignored,
the environmental assessment is more nuanced and we identify biomass selling emission
intensity and biomass demand as the two main drivers of this assessment. In particular,
we establish two biomass selling emission intensity thresholds where once this emission in-
tensity is lower (higher) than the smaller (larger) threshold, biomass commercialization is
environmentally beneficial (harmful); otherwise, biomass commercialization is environmen-
tally beneficial only when biomass demand is lower than a demand threshold. We also find
that this demand threshold decreases in the biomass selling emission intensity.
Our results demonstrate that conventional arguments for and against the environmental
superiority of biomass commercialization based on such simple proxy as comparison between
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biomass selling and landfill emission intensities can be misleading. In particular, our anal-
ysis highlights two types of misconceptions (and characterizes the specific conditions under
which they appear). First, the processor would mistakenly think that commercializing its
biomass is environmentally beneficial when it is not. The implication is that agricultural
processors, which emphasize conversion of their residue as an argument for the environmen-
tal superiority of their business models could be vulnerable to accusations of greenwashing.
Second, the processor would mistakenly think that commercializing its biomass is not en-
vironmentally beneficial when it is. In this case, an environmentally conscious processor
can pass up a profitable investment opportunity (commercializing its biomass) based on an
incomplete environmental assessment.
Based on our model calibration, we observe that a typical palm oil in Malaysia can
justifiably claim that selling its palm kernel shell (PKS) to a bioenergy plant in Japan to
substitute coal in energy production is environmentally beneficial unless biomass demand is
larger than a level that is associated with approximately 82% processing capacity utilization.
Interestingly, when PKS is used for substituting liquified natural gas, which is a cleaner en-
ergy source than coal, PKS commercialization becomes environmentally harmful regardless
of the biomass demand. These results have important practical implications. First, care
must be taken by palm oil mills to not promote commercializing PKS as environmentally
beneficial without qualification. Second, given the current trend in the energy industry that
suggests the discontinuation of coal-fired energy production by 2030 (Dempsey 2019), it is
important for these mills to take actions to reduce, for example, transportation emissions
(by choosing cleaner transportation options or selling biomass locally) to keep biomass com-
mercialization environmentally beneficial. To this end, the on-going industry-wide efforts
for reducing the carbon emissions in shipping (Milne 2018) also have an indirect, and po-
tentially a crucial positive environmental impact on agricultural waste-to-energy industry.
To understand the impact of biomass market characteristics on the environmental as-
sessment, we conduct sensitivity analyses to investigate the effects of biomass demand and
biomass price on the change in expected emissions after commercialization. We find that an
increase in biomass demand is environmentally superior only when biomass selling emission
intensity is low; otherwise, it is environmentally inferior. On the other hand, an increase
in biomass price is environmentally superior only when biomass selling emission intensity is
low or it is moderate and biomass demand is low; otherwise, it is environmentally inferior.
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Because a higher biomass demand or price always increases the value of commercialization,
these results emphasize that what is economically beneficial is not always environmentally
beneficial. This conflict may create challenges in the effectiveness of government policies
designed for increasing renewable energy production. For example, in recent years govern-
ments have adopted policies (e.g., feed-in-tariff) to promote investment in renewable energy
sources (Babich et al. 2019). As a result, there has been a growing number of bioenergy
plants leading to an increase in biomass demand for agricultural processors. Our findings
demonstrate that this increase may hinder biomass commercialization in an environmentally
conscious processor unless its biomass selling emission intensity is low. Therefore, we sug-
gest that governments also devise policies to incent the processors to reduce their biomass
selling emission intensity. This can be achieved, for example, by encouraging (through in-
vestment subsidies) pelletizing of the biomass before shipment, as is often done in the wood
industry, to increase its calorific value so that a larger amount of fossil fuel is substituted.
Another policy implication of our results is relevant for biomass-exporting countries
(e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia). Some of these countries have recently started imposing export
tax for biomass to encourage the growth of domestic bioenergy industry (see, for example,
The Palm Scribe 2018). When biomass is sold locally, all else equal, a processor experiences
a higher biomass price due to the absence of export tax (and a lower biomass selling emission
intensity due to lower transportation emissions). Our results demonstrate that imposing
an export tax is the right move in the growth stage of biomass industry (when biomass
demand is relatively low) because a higher price is both economically and environmentally
superior leading to processor’s voluntary commercialization of its biomass.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 surveys the related literature
and discusses the contribution of our work. We examine the economic and environmental
impacts of biomass commercialization in §3 and §4, respectively. §5 provides a practical
application in the context of the palm industry. §6 concludes with a discussion of the
limitations of our analysis and future research directions.
2 Literature Review
Our paper’s main contribution is to the emerging operations management (OM) literature
on by-product synergy. The papers in this literature study the economic implications of con-
verting waste stream into a saleable product by considering the operational characteristics
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of specific processing environments. For example, Ata et al. (2012) study a waste-to-energy
(WTE) firm that collects and processes municipal waste to generate electricity. Lee and
Tongarlak (2017) focus on a retail grocer setting and examine the value of using unsold fresh
produce to make prepared food items. More recently, Ata et al. (2019) examine another
type of by-product synergy in the context of agricultural industries: gleaning operations
that deal with collecting unharvested crops on the farmlands to be used in food assistance
programs. They study the dynamic staffing problem to schedule volunteers to collect un-
harvested crops. Different from these papers, Sunar and Plambeck (2016) consider the
interplay between by-product synergy and costs associated with the GHG emissions. They
model the strategic interaction between a seller and a buyer located in different countries.
The buyer incurs a cost associated with GHG emissions of the seller’s production activi-
ties due to border adjustment. They examine how seller’s decision of converting its waste
stream into a saleable product has an impact on buyer’s operations.
Closest to our work, Lee (2012) studies the economic and environmental implications
of converting waste stream into a saleable product in the context of the chemicals and
steel manufacturing industries. Motivated by these industries, she focuses on a determin-
istic model that optimizes production volumes for the main output and the by-product
(waste) while considering waste disposal cost, virgin raw material cost and competition in
the by-product market. Motivated by our own experience with a coconut processor commer-
cializing its waste stream, we focus on an exogenously given fixed-price fixed-volume sales
contract for biomass and do not consider competition in the biomass market. Instead, we
consider other important characteristics of agricultural processors (e.g., input and output
spot price uncertainties). On the environmental implications, Lee (2012) presents a con-
ceptual framework and makes the critical observation that waste conversion decreases the
processing cost which, in turn, increases the production volumes for the outputs (including
waste). She conjectures that the increase in total volume could lead to a harmful impact on
the environment. Our paper builds on this conjecture and identifies conditions under which
biomass commercialization leads to a beneficial or harmful impact on the environment.
Environmental implications of biomass commercialization has also received considerable
attention from the industrial ecology literature. We refer the reader to Iakovou et al. (2010)
for a comprehensive review. As highlighted by Lee and Tongarlak (2017), the papers in
this literature examine the environmental impact without considering the optimization of
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operations but provide a detailed treatment of GHG emissions related to biomass commer-
cialization. For example, Damen and Faaij (2006) study the emissions associated with using
palm kernel shells (PKS) produced in Malaysia to substitute coal in a power plant located
in the Netherlands while considering the emissions associated with production, transporta-
tion, and consumption of PKS. They neither consider optimization of PKS operations nor
take into account uncertainties. Our environmental analysis is motivated by the papers in
this literature as it accounts for all emission categories. More importantly, our environmen-
tal analysis is based on a more detailed operational framework that not only considers the
optimization of processor’s decisions but also takes into account the relevant uncertainties.
We also provide a model calibration to examine the environmental implications of PKS
commercialization in a typical palm oil mill located in Malaysia where PKS is used for
substituting coal or liquified natural gas at a power plant located in Japan.
Our paper is also related to the growing OM literature on commodity processing. As
reviewed by Goel and Tanrisever (2017), the papers in this literature capture idiosyncratic
features of commodity processors in a variety of industries and examine the economic im-
plications of a broad range of operational features, including processing-yield improving
technology (de Zegher et al. 2017), procurement flexibility (Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Simchi-
Levi 2005), and responsive product pricing (Boyabatlı et al. 2011). Within this literature,
our work is closely related to the stream of papers that considers input and output (spot)
price uncertainties. In this stream, Plambeck and Taylor (2013) study process improve-
ment investment decision in a clean-tech manufacturing setting; Dong et al. (2014) study
the value of operational flexibility in a petroleum refinery; Boyabatlı et al. (2017) study
the optimal capacity investment decision of an oilseed processor; and Goel and Tanrisever
(2017) examine the optimal sales contract choice of a biofuel processor. Similar to these
papers, we capture idiosyncratic features of processors in a particular industry (agriculture)
facing input and output spot price uncertainties. Different from these papers, we focus on
biomass commercialization (another operational feature) and study not only the economic
implications but also the environmental implications.
This paper also relates to the rapidly growing literature on sustainable operations—see,
Drake and Spinler (2013) for a recent review—due to its focus on the environment. Within
this literature, our work is more closely related to the stream of papers that examine the en-
vironmental implications of operational decisions that are made by profit-maximizing firms
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without considering their environmental impact (see, for example, Agrawal et al. 2012, Avcı
et al. 2014, and Ko¨k et al. 2016). Ko¨k et al. (2016) is closer to our work because of its
focus on energy production. They study the economic and environmental implications of
using different electricity pricing policies—peak versus flat pricing—from the perspective
of a utility firm. They solve for the optimal profit-maximizing operational decisions and
investigate the environmental implications by comparing the total expected carbon emis-
sions of an optimally designed utility under each pricing policy. We study the economic and
environmental implications of biomass commercialization from the perspective of an agri-
processor. We solve for the optimal profit-maximizing operational decisions and investigate
the environmental implications by making a comparison between the total expected carbon
emissions of an optimally designed processor before and after biomass commercialization.
3 Economic Implications of Biomass Commercialization
We first describe the economic model (§3.1) and derive the firm’s optimal strategy before and
after commercialization (§3.2). We then characterize the value of biomass commercialization
(§3.3) and examine the impact of spot price uncertainty on this value (§3.4).
3.1 Economic Model Description and Assumptions
The following mathematical representation is used throughout the text: a realization of the
random variable y˜ is denoted by y. The expectation operator, probability, and indicator
function are denoted by E, Pr(·), and χ(·), respectively. We use (u)+ = max(u, 0). The
monotonic relations are used in the weak sense unless otherwise stated. Subscript 0 denotes
input-related parameters and decision variables, while subscript 1 (2) denotes the same
related to the output (biomass). All the proofs are relegated to §C of the online appendix.
We consider a firm that procures and processes a commodity input to produce and sell
a commodity output and biomass in fixed proportions so as to maximize its expected profit
in a single selling season. We model the firm’s decisions as a two-stage problem: the firm
makes its contract procurement decision under input and output spot price uncertainties
(stage 1); and the firm makes its contract exercise, spot procurement, processing and selling
decisions after these uncertainties are realized (stage 2).
Let S˜0 and S˜1 denote the uncertain input and output spot price, respectively. We assume
that (S˜0, S˜1) follow a bivariate distribution with a positive support, bounded expectation
(µ0, µ1) with covariance matrix Σ, where Σ00 = σ
2
0, Σ11 = σ
2
1, Σ01 = Σ10 = ρσ0σ1, and ρ
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denotes the correlation coefficient. We make further assumptions about (S˜0, S˜1) in §3.4 to
study the effect of spot price uncertainty.
The firm has two sources for input procurement, a contract and a spot market. We
assume that the firm uses a quantity flexibility contract that is characterized by a unit
reservation cost β and a unit exercise cost that is normalized to zero. Let Q denote the
contract volume reserved in advance of the spot market (by incurring the unit cost β). On
the spot day, the firm decides how much of this contracted volume is delivered. On the day
the firm can also source from the input spot market at the prevailing price S0 to process.
Let z0 denote the processing volume. We consider a processing capacity K0 and a unit
processing cost c0. We assume that each unit of processed input yields a1 and a2 units of
commodity output and biomass, respectively (where a1 + a2 < 1). In practice, each unit
of processed input may also yield other by-products. For example, in the palm industry,
processing of fresh fruit palm bunches yields not only crude palm oil (commodity output)
and palm kernel shell (biomass) but also other by-products, including palm oil mill eﬄuent
and palm kernel. Because our model only considers commodity output and biomass for
brevity, it is (implicitly) assumed that unit sale revenue from each of these by-products (if
any) is normalized into the processing cost c0. Hence, we allow c0 to take negative values.
We consider two channels for commodity output sale, a spot market and a demand which
is characterized by a fixed-price fixed-volume sales contract. In particular, we assume that
the commodity output can be sold at a unit price p1 to satisfy demand D1, and it can be
sold to the spot market at the prevailing spot price S1. The commodity output can also be
procured from the spot market at the prevailing price S1 to satisfy the demand. For biomass
sale, we only consider a demand channel which is characterized by a similar sales contract
where the firm can sell up to biomass demand D2 with a marginal sale revenue p2. Here, p2
refers to the difference between the unit sale price and the additional unit processing cost
incurred (if any) for biomass (e.g., cost for de-fibring). For brevity, thereafter we denote p2
as the biomass price. We normalize the penalty costs associated with unsatisfied demand
for commodity output and biomass to zero. Positive penalty costs can easily be introduced
into our model and they do not affect our results. The benchmark model that represents
the firm before biomass commercialization can be obtained by setting D2 = 0. Throughout
our analysis, to rule out uninteresting cases, we assume K0 ≥ max
(
D1
a1
, D2a2
)
; otherwise,
satisfying the commodity output or biomass demand through processing is not feasible.
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In practice, biomass commercialization involves significant fixed costs that are associated
with investments in pre-conditioning machines (for removing impurities from the residue
and eliminating moisture), storage facility, and transportation assets (for example, conveyor
belt or crane for transportation out of the storage facility). These fixed costs require the
processors to evaluate the value of biomass commercialization well in advance of the spot
day in which the actual conversion of waste into a saleable product takes place. We do not
consider the fixed costs in our model as they do not have an impact on our economic analysis.
That being said, the significance of these fixed costs reinforces the need for processors to
better understand the value of biomass commercialization (which can then be compared
with the fixed costs) and also how spot price uncertainty affects this value, the two research
questions we answer in §3.3 and §3.4, respectively.
3.2 The Optimal Solution for the Firm’s Decisions
In this section, we describe the optimal solution for the firm’s decisions after biomass com-
mercialization. The optimal decisions before commercialization can be obtained as a special
case. We solve the firm’s problem using backward induction.
In stage 1, the firm contracted (reserved) Q units of input. In stage 2, the firm observes
the input and output spot price realizations (S0, S1). In this stage, constrained by the
processing capacity K0, the firm decides the processing volume z0, how to source this
volume from the available contracted input and spot procurement, the amount of demand
to satisfy for the commodity output and biomass, the commodity output volume to sell to
the output spot market, and the commodity output volume to buy from the spot market
to satisfy demand. Expressing all decisions as a function of the processing volume allows
us to formulate the firm’s decision problem as a single-variable maximization problem over
the processing volume z0 ∈ [0,K0] where the stage 2 objective function is given by
Π(z0)
.
=− (z0 −Q)+S0 − c0z0 + min(a2z0, D2)p2
+ min(a1z0, D1) max(p1, S1) + (a1z0 −D1)+S1 + (D1 − a1z0)+(p1 − S1)+.
(1)
In (1), the first term is the input procurement cost from the spot market and the second
term is the processing cost. The third term denotes the revenues from biomass demand
sale. The remaining terms denote the total revenues from commodity output sales. In
particular, for the first min(a1z0, D1) units of commodity output, the firm can choose to
either satisfy demand at a unit price p1 or sell to the output spot market at the prevailing
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price S1. Therefore, the marginal revenue for these units is max(p1, S1). When all demand
is satisfied (i.e., for (a1z0 − D1)+ units of commodity output), the firm can only sell to
the spot market. For the unsatisfied demand over the available commodity output (i.e., for
(D1 − a1z0)+ units), the firm procures from the output spot market to satisfy the demand
if it is profitable to do so. Therefore, the marginal revenue for these units is (p1 − S1)+.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal processing volume z∗0 that maximizes Π(z0).
Proposition 1 Given a contract volume Q and spot price realizations (S0, S1), the optimal
processing volume z∗0 is characterized by
z∗0 =

0 if h¯(S1) ≤ 0
min
(
D2
a2
, Q
)
if h(S1) ≤ 0 ≤ h¯(S1) ≤ S0
D2
a2
if h(S1) ≤ 0 ≤ S0 ≤ h¯(S1)
Q if 0 ≤ h(S1) ≤ h¯(S1) ≤ S0
max
(
D2
a2
, Q
)
if 0 ≤ h(S1) ≤ S0 ≤ h¯(S1)
K0 if S0 ≤ h(S1)
(2)
where h¯(S1)
.
= a1S1 + a2p2 − c0 and h(S1) .= a1S1 − c0 are unit processing margins when
there is unsatisfied biomass demand and no unsatisfied biomass demand, respectively.
The stage 2 objective function Π(z0) in (1) is piecewise linear and concave in z0. Therefore,
the optimal solution occurs at the breakpoints
{
0, D2a2 , Q,K0
}
and it is determined by com-
paring the relevant unit processing margin—that is, the marginal revenue from production
minus the processing cost—with the input procurement cost at this stage (which is prevail-
ing spot price S0 for spot-procured input and 0 for the contracted input).
2 For example,
if h(S1) ≤ 0 ≤ h¯(S1) ≤ S0, then it is profitable to process only when there is unsatisfied
biomass demand and only with the contracted input, and thus, z∗0 = min
(
D2
a2
, Q
)
.
In stage 1, the firm chooses the optimal contract volumeQ∗ ≥ 0 with respect to uncertain
spot prices so as to maximize the expected profit E
[
pi(Q; S˜0, S˜1)
]
−βQ, where pi(Q;S0, S1)
denotes the optimal stage 2 profit for a given contract volume and spot price realizations.
2We note that D1
a1
is not one of the breakpoints because the marginal revenue from production of com-
modity output does not change when its demand is satisfied. For z0 ≤ D1a1 , when S1 > p1, spot sale is more
profitable than satisfying demand and the marginal revenue is a1S1. Otherwise (i.e., when S1 ≤ p1), the
marginal revenue is again a1S1 which is the opportunity gain of not sourcing from the output spot market
to satisfy the demand. For z0 >
D1
a1
, only spot sale is possible and the marginal revenue is again a1S1.
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Proposition 2 Let
¯
β
.
= E[min(S˜0, (a1S˜1 − c0)+)] and β¯ .= E[min(S˜0, (a1S˜1 + a2p2 − c0)+)]
with
¯
β < β¯. The optimal contract volume Q∗ is given by 0 if β ≥ β¯, D2a2 if ¯
β ≤ β < β¯, and
K0 if 0 ≤ β <
¯
β.
The optimal contract volume is characterized by comparing the unit contract cost β with the
expected marginal revenue of an additional unit of contracted input, as given by
¯
β and β¯.
At stage 2, the marginal revenue takes different forms as it depends on the input and output
spot price realizations. When the input spot price is less than the relevant unit processing
margin, that is (a1S1 + a2p2 − c0)+ ((a1S1 − c0)+) when there is (no) unsatisfied biomass
demand, it is profitable to source from the input spot market for processing. Therefore, the
marginal revenue is given by the opportunity gain of not buying from the spot market; that
is, S0. Otherwise, the marginal revenue is given by the unit processing margin.
Recall that we consider a benchmark model in which the firm only sells the commodity
output (and biomass goes to landfill). The firm’s optimal decisions in this benchmark
model can be obtained from our characterizations by setting D2 = 0. It is important to
note that biomass commercialization affects the optimal contract volume. In particular, as
follows from Proposition 2, in the absence of biomass the firm optimally procures up to the
processing capacity K0 if β <
¯
β and does not procure otherwise. We use this observation
in characterizing the value of biomass commercialization in the next section.
3.3 The Value of Biomass Commercialization
The value of biomass commercialization is given by the change in the firm’s optimal ex-
pected profit due to commercialization; let ∆V denote this value. Because the firm’s optimal
contracting decision is affected by commercialization and the optimal contract volume is
characterized based on the unit contract cost β, we examine the value of biomass com-
mercialization for a given β. In particular, we define ∆V (β) = V ∗(β) − V nb(β) where
V ∗(β) is the firm’s optimal expected profit after commercialization (evaluated at the opti-
mal contract volume Q∗(β)) and V nb(β), “nb” stands for no biomass, is the same before
commercialization (evaluated at the optimal contract volume Qnb(β)). Proposition 3 char-
acterizes ∆V (β).
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Proposition 3 The value of commercialization is given by ∆V (β) = M(β)D2 where
M(β)
.
=

1
a2
E
[(
a2p2 −
(
c0 − a1S˜1
)+)+]
if 0 ≤ β <
¯
β
1
a2
(
E
[(
a2p2 + min
(
S˜0, a1S˜1 − c0
))+]− β) if
¯
β ≤ β < β¯
1
a2
E
[(
a2p2 −
(
S˜0 + c0 − a1S˜1
)+)+]
if β ≥ β¯
(3)
with
¯
β and β¯ as defined in Proposition 2. Moreover, M(β) ∈ [0, p2].
The value is characterized by the product of biomass demand D2 and M(β) which can
be interpreted as the expected biomass margin. This expected margin captures the effects
of spot price uncertainty and firm’s optimal decisions, and it takes three forms based on
the optimal contracting decisions before and after commercialization. The intuition behind
each form can be explained based on the realized biomass margin on the spot day (stage 2).
Consider the case when the contract cost is high (i.e., β ≥ β¯) in which the firm entirely
relies on input spot procurement before and after commercialization; that is, Qnb(β) =
Q∗(β) = 0. At stage 2, when S1 is sufficiently small such that it is not profitable to
process even in the presence of biomass (i.e., a2p2 + a1S1 − c0 ≤ S0), the realized margin is
zero. When S1 is sufficiently large such that it is profitable to process even in the absence
of biomass (i.e., a1S1 − c0 ≥ S0), the waste stream is already available, and hence, the
realized margin is p2. For the remaining S1 realizations, biomass commercialization makes
the processing profitable and the realized margin is p2 − S0+c0−a1S1a2 . Consider now the low
contract cost case (i.e., β <
¯
β) in which Qnb(β) = Q∗(β) = K0. In this case, the firm does
not rely on input spot procurement and the realized processing margin follows a similar
intuition with the high contract cost case after substituting S0 with 0 (which is the stage
2 procurement cost). The general insights from the high and low contract cost cases are
that biomass commercialization does not affect the contract procurement decision and the
realized margin at stage 2, which is non-negative, does not exceed p2.
When the contract cost is moderate (i.e.,
¯
β ≤ β < β¯), biomass commercialization incents
the firm to engage in contract procurement where Qnb(β) = 0 and Q∗(β) = D2a2 . As a result,
interestingly, the realized biomass margin at stage 2 can be negative and can exceed p2.
In particular, when S1 is sufficiently small such that it is not profitable to process even
in the presence of biomass (i.e., a2p2 + a1S1 − c0 ≤ 0), the realized margin is −β. In
this case, the realized margin is negative because of the contract commitment cost after
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commercialization. When S1 is sufficiently large such that it is profitable to process even in
the absence of biomass (i.e., a1S1− c0 ≥ S0), the realized margin is p2 + S0−βa2 . In this case,
the realized margin involves the opportunity gain from not sourcing the input from spot
market (given by S0) at a cost of contract commitment (given by β). This realized margin
can be larger than p2 (when the input spot price realization S0 is larger than β). For the
remaining S1 realizations, biomass commercialization makes the processing profitable and
the realized margin is p2 +
a1S1−c0−β
a2
. Once again, this realized margin can be larger than
p2, specifically when the output spot price realization S1 is large enough.
The characterization presented in Proposition 3 showcases the complexity of biomass
commercialization valuation and emphasizes the need for a formal analysis, as conducted in
this paper. As intuition suggests (and as follows from Proposition 3), the value of biomass
commercialization cannot be larger than the maximum biomass sale revenue p2D2. In the
next section we examine how this value is affected from spot price uncertainty.
3.4 Impact of Spot Price Uncertainty
We now conduct sensitivity analyses to study the effects of spot price correlation (ρ) and
input and output spot price variabilities (σ0 and σ1, respectively) on the value of biomass
commercialization ∆V (β). For tractability, we focus on local sensitivity analyses in which
the optimal contracting decisions before and after commercialization are not affected by the
changes in these parameters—that is, we consider an unaffected ordering of unit contract
cost β and the cost thresholds
¯
β and β¯ given in Proposition 2. With a sufficiently large
change in σ0, σ1, or ρ, the ordering may be affected because
¯
β and β¯ depend on these
parameters. We consider the effect of such large changes on our results in §5 where we
conduct global sensitivity analyses by resorting to numerical experiments.
Throughout this section, we assume (S˜0, S˜1) to follow a bivariate Normal distribution.
We also make two additional assumptions to eliminate unrealistic (and uninteresting) cases:
ρ > 0 and a1µ1 > c0 + µ0—that is, processor has a profitable business (on expectation)
before biomass commercialization. Both assumptions are reasonable in the palm industry
as we empirically demonstrate in §5. Proposition 4 characterizes the effects of ρ, σ0, and
σ1 on the value of biomass commercialization ∆V (β).
Proposition 4 Effects of ρ, σ0 and σ1 on ∆V (β) are characterized in Table 1 where
¯
β and
β¯ are as given in Proposition 2:
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Unit Contract Cost β ρ σ0 σ1
Low: β <
¯
β − − ↓
Moderate:
¯
β ≤ β < β¯ ↑ ↑ for σ0 ≤ a1σ1ρ ↑ for σ1 ≤ σ0ρ/a1↓ for σ0 > a1σ1ρ No analytical result
High: β ≥ β¯ ↑ ↑ for σ0 ≤ a1σ1ρ ↑ for σ1 ≤ σ0ρ/a1↓ for σ0 > a1σ1ρ ↓ for σ1 > σ0ρ/a1
Table 1: Impact of a Local Increase in Input (Output) Spot Price Variability σ0 (σ1) and
Correlation (ρ) on the Value of Biomass Commercialization with Bivariate Normal Spot
Price Uncertainty: − denotes no change, ↑ denotes an increase, and ↓ denotes a decrease.
When the contract cost is low (i.e., β <
¯
β), ∆V (β) is not affected by changes in ρ and
σ0 because the firm contracts up to the processing capacity K0 both before and after
commercialization, and thus, input spot sourcing is never used. In this case, as follows
from Proposition 3, when it is profitable to process after commercialization on the day, the
effective marginal sourcing cost of biomass is given by (c0 − a1S1)+ (when a1S1 ≥ c0, it
is profitable to process in the absence of biomass and the effective marginal sourcing cost
is zero because waste stream is already available). The influence of σ1 on ∆V (β) can be
explained by its opposite effect on the expected marginal sourcing cost E[(c0 − a1S˜1)+]. It
is well known that this expectation increases in σ1, and thus, a higher σ1 decreases ∆V (β).
When the contract cost is high (i.e., β ≥ β¯), the firm only uses input spot sourcing before
and after commercialization. In this case, as follows from Proposition 3, when it is profitable
to process after commercialization on the day, the effective marginal sourcing cost of biomass
is given by (S0 +c0−a1S1)+. The sensitivity results in Proposition 4 can be explained based
on the opposite of how E[(S˜0+c0−a1S˜1)+] changes in ρ, σ0, and σ1. It is well known that this
expectation increases in the variability of S˜0 − a1S˜1 which is increasing in the variances of
S˜0 and a1S˜1, and is decreasing in the covariance of (S˜0, a1S˜1). With a higher ρ, because the
covariance increases, the variability of S˜0−a1S˜1 decreases, and thus, ∆V (β) increases. With
a higher σ0 (σ1) both the variance of S˜0 (a1S˜1) and covariance of (S˜0, a1S˜1) increase because
ρ > 0 by assumption. When σ0 (σ1) is sufficiently low; that is, σ0 ≤ a1σ1ρ (σ1 ≤ σ0ρ/a1),
the latter effect outweighs the former and the variability of S˜0 − a1S˜1 decreases, and thus,
∆V (β) increases. Otherwise, the former effect dominates and ∆V (β) decreases. The impact
of spot price uncertainty on ∆V (β) for the moderate contract cost case (i.e.,
¯
β ≤ β < β¯)
can be explained in a similar fashion except for the effect of σ1. In this case, because the
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firm only uses input spot sourcing before commercialization but relies on contract after
commercialization, ∆V (β) = E[(a1S˜1 + a2p2 − c0)+ − β]− E[(a1S˜1 − S˜0 − c0)+]. While the
first expectation always increases in σ1, because the second expectation decreases in the
same only when σ1 ≤ σ0ρ/a1, the overall impact can only be proven under this condition.
The general insights from Proposition 4 are that the value of biomass commercialization
increases in spot price correlation but increases in (input or output) spot price variability
only when this variability is low; otherwise, the value decreases in spot price variability.
4 Environmental Implications of Biomass Commercialization
We now investigate the impact of biomass commercialization on the environment. §4.1
describes the environmental model. §4.2 characterizes the conditions under which the firm
can justifiably claim that commercializing its biomass is environmentally beneficial and §4.3
examines the impact of biomass market characteristics on the environmental assessment.
4.1 Environmental Model Description and Assumptions
In line with the industry practice and the academic literature (see, for example, Ko¨k et al.
2016), we use carbon emissions to measure the environmental impact and calculate the total
expected carbon emissions resulting from profit-maximizing operational decisions before and
after biomass commercialization. Echo to our economic model described in §4.1, we consider
emissions related to processor’s operational activities, including procurement, processing,
and selling. To this end, as customary in the literature, we assume a linear emission
structure and define a unit emission intensity parameter for each of these activities.
For input procurement, we define eb0 > 0 as the input buying emission intensity asso-
ciated with each input delivered to the processor. This parameter captures the emissions
from production (growing) and transportation (to the processor) of the input. We assume
that this emission intensity is the same for spot-sourced and contract-sourced inputs which
is a reasonable assumption when both inputs are sourced from nearby plantations. Let
ep0 > 0 denote the processing emission intensity which accounts for the emissions from en-
ergy consumption during processing. In our economic model we assume that each unit of
input yields other by-products whose revenues are normalized into the processing cost. To
capture the emissions associated with these other by-products (for example, emissions re-
lated to disposal of palm oil mill eﬄuent), we define er3 > 0 as the residue emission intensity
and assume that each unit of processed input yields a3 units of these by-products (where
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a3 ≤ 1− a1 − a2). For biomass, paralleling the environmental impact discussed in practice
(Ata et al. 2012), we define two emission parameters. For unsold biomass, we define el2 > 0
as the landfill emission intensity which captures the emissions associated with release of
methane gas as a result of anaerobic decomposition. For biomass that is sold, we define es2
as the biomass selling emission intensity which accounts for the emissions associated with
additional processing (e.g., de-fibring), transportation, and usage—that is, emissions asso-
ciated with burning of biomass less the emission savings obtained by substituting fossil fuel
for energy production. Although this intensity parameter is unrestricted in sign (because
of emission savings), it takes positive values in realistic cases (as empirically verified in §5).
For the commodity output, we also define two emission parameters. For the commodity
output sold, es1 > 0 denotes the commodity output selling emission intensity which captures
transportation (out of the processor) and usage (e.g., refining) emissions. We assume that
this emission intensity is the same for output sold to the spot market and output used to
satisfy demand. This is a reasonable assumption when both outputs are sold to nearby
buyers (e.g., refineries). For the commodity output purchased, eb1 > 0 denotes the com-
modity output buying emission intensity which captures the emissions associated with the
production of this output and its transportation to the processor.
To quantify the total expected emissions resulting from profit-maximizing decisions,
because the optimal contract volume is characterized based on the unit contract cost β, we
define ECE∗(β) as the total expected emissions after commercialization for a given β:
ECE∗ (β) .=
(
eb0 + e
p
0 + a3e
r
3
)
E [z∗0 (Q∗ (β))] (4)
+ es1E [a1z∗0 (Q∗ (β))] +
(
eb1 + e
s
1
)
E
[
(D1 − a1z∗0 (Q∗ (β)))+ χ(S˜1 ≤ p1)
]
+ es2E [min (a2z∗0 (Q∗ (β)) , D2)] + el2E
[
(a2z
∗
0 (Q
∗ (β))−D2)+
]
.
In (4), the first term represents the emissions from input sourcing, processing, and residues.
The second and third terms denote the emissions associated with commodity output sales
and procurement, respectively where the latter emissions are incurred only when it is opti-
mal to source from the output spot market to satisfy demand. The last two terms denote the
emissions related to biomass, either from satisfying the biomass demand or waste disposal
through landfill.3 The optimal contract volume Q∗(β) can be obtained from Proposition 2
whereas the optimal processing volume z∗0(Q∗(β)) can be obtained from Proposition 1 by
3We note that ECE∗(β) does not include a term directly associated with the optimal contract procure-
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substituting Q∗(β). The total expected emissions before commercialization, ECEnb(β), can
be obtained in a similar fashion by setting D2 = 0 and substituting the optimal processing
volume znb0 (Q
nb(β)) in (4).
4.2 Environmental Assessment of Biomass Commercialization
To characterize the impact of biomass commercialization on the environment, we define
∆ECE(β)
.
= ECE∗(β)−ECEnb(β) as the change in total expected carbon emissions after
commercialization. The processor can justifiably claim that commercializing its biomass is
environmentally beneficial when it leads to reduction in emissions; that is, ∆ECE(β) < 0.
When ∆ECE(β) > 0, we conclude that biomass commercialization is environmentally
harmful. Using ECE∗(β) (and ECEnb(β)) as given in (4), we obtain
∆ECE(β) =
(
es2 − el2
)
E
[
min
(
a2z
nb
0 (Q
nb (β)), D2
)]
(5)
+
(
eb0 + e
p
0 + a3e
r
3 + a2e
l
2 + a1e
s
1
)
E
[
z∗0 (Q
∗ (β))− znb0 (Qnb (β))
]
−
(
eb1 + e
s
1
)
E
[((
D1 − a1znb0 (Qnb (β))
)+ − (D1 − a1z∗0(Q∗ (β)))+)χ(S˜1 ≤ p1)]
+
(
es2 − el2
)
E
[
min (a2z
∗
0 (Q
∗ (β)) , D2)−min
(
a2z
nb
0 (Q
nb (β)), D2
)]
.
To delineate the intuition behind (5), let us first consider the case where z∗0(Q∗(β)) =
znb0 (Q
nb(β)) for any (S0, S1) realization at stage 2—that is, the changes in operational
decisions after commercialization are ignored. In this case, only the first term in (5) is
relevant. This term captures the expected emissions resulting from converting available
waste, which would go to landfill, into a saleable product and using it to substitute fossil
fuel in energy production. In this case, consistent with the common perception in practice
which also ignores the changes in operational decisions, our analysis reveals that biomass
commercialization is environmentally beneficial (harmful) when biomass selling emission
intensity is lower (higher) than the landfill emission intensity.
When the changes in operational decisions after commercialization are not ignored, the
last three terms in (5) become relevant. Because commercialization creates a new revenue
stream, intuitively, for a given contract volume Q, the optimal processing volume for any
(S0, S1) realization at stage 2 increases (i.e., z
∗
0(Q) ≥ znb0 (Q)), and thus, the optimal contract
ment volume Q∗(β) because we only consider emissions related to input delivered to the processor (and,
consistent with industry practice, do not consider emissions related to the reserved but unused input) and we
assume that unit input buying emission intensity is the same for spot-sourced and contract-sourced inputs.
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volume increases (i.e., Q∗(β) ≥ Qnb(β)). As a result, we have z∗0(Q∗(β)) ≥ znb0 (Qnb(β)) in
(5) for any (S0, S1) realization. Therefore, the second term in (5) (which captures the
emission impact of higher processing volume after commercialization) is always positive—
that is, this change is harmful to the environment. Similarly, the third term (which captures
the emission impact of lower commodity output procurement volume due to higher output
production after commercialization) is always negative—that is, this change is beneficial
for the environment. Finally, the last term (which captures the emissions associated with
having more waste to be sold as biomass after commercialization) has the same sign with the
first term—that is, this change is beneficial (harmful) for the environment when es2 < (>)e
l
2.
In summary, once the changes in the operational decisions after commercialization are
not ignored, environmental assessment is more nuanced. Proposition 5 identifies biomass
selling emission intensity and biomass demand as the two main drivers of this assessment.
Proposition 5 There exist two thresholds es2, e
s
2 with e
s
2 ≤ es2 such that
(i) if es2 ≤ es2, then ∆ECE(β) < 0;
(ii) if es2 ≥ es2, then ∆ECE(β) ≥ 0 with equality holding when es2 = es2;
(iii) if es2 < e
s
2 < e
s
2, then there exists a unique D¯2(e
s
2) > a2D1/a1 such that ∆ECE(β) ≤
0 for D2 ≤ min(D¯2(es2), a2K0) with equality holding when D2 = D¯2(es2), and ∆ECE(β) > 0
for min(D¯2(e
s
2), a2K0) < D2 ≤ a2K0. Moreover, ∂D¯2(es2)/∂es2 < 0, ∂2D¯2(es2)/∂(es2)2 > 0,
limes2→es−2 D¯2(e
s
2) = a2D1/a1, and limes2→es+2 D¯2(e
s
2) =∞.
Proposition 5 establishes two biomass selling emission intensity thresholds es2 ≤ es2 where
once this emission intensity is lower (higher) than es2 (e
s
2), biomass commercialization is en-
vironmentally beneficial (harmful). When the biomass selling emission intensity is between
these two thresholds, biomass commercialization is environmentally beneficial only when
biomass demand is lower than a threshold D¯2(e
s
2) which (convexly) decreases in e
s
2. We
defer the discussion of intuition behind how these thresholds are obtained from (5) to the
next section (where we discuss how ∆ECE(β) is impacted by the biomass demand D2).
How does the environmental assessment in Proposition 5 contrast with the common
perception in practice? Because this common perception is based on a comparison between
biomass selling and landfill emission intensities, we now examine how the emission intensity
thresholds established in Proposition 5 compare with the landfill emission intensity.
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Proposition 6 Let es2(e
l
2) and e
s
2(e
l
2) denote the thresholds defined in Proposition 5 for
a given el2. We have e
s
2(e
l
2) < e
l
2 and there exists a unique threshold eˆ
l
2 ≥ 0 such that
es2(e
l
2) > e
l
2 for 0 ≤ el2 < eˆl2 and es2(el2) ≤ el2 for el2 ≥ eˆl2.
Proposition 6 proves that while the smaller threshold is always lower than the landfill
emission intensity el2, the larger threshold is lower than the same only when the landfill
emission intensity is small; otherwise, this threshold is higher. Using these results, Figure
1 illustrates the environmental assessment characterization for a given low (panel a) and
high (panel b) el2 which is set to be the origin of the horizontal axis representing e
s
2.
(a) For a given el2 < eˆ
l
2 (b) For a given e
l
2 ≥ eˆl2
Figure 1: When Does Biomass Commercialization Lead to a Reduction (Increase) in Total
Expected Emissions; that is, ∆ECE(β) < 0 (∆ECE(β) > 0)? Effects of biomass selling
emission intensity es2 and biomass demand D2 for a given landfill emission intensity e
l
2.
In comparison with the common perception in practice, Figure 1 highlights two types of
misconceptions (and illustrates specific conditions under which they appear). First, in region
I, the processor would mistakenly think that commercializing its biomass is environmentally
beneficial when it is not. In this case, the harmful environmental impact of increasing
processing volume after commercialization, the second term in (5), outweighs the other
three effects which are beneficial for the environment. Second, in region II, the processor
would mistakenly think that commercializing its biomass is not environmentally beneficial
when it is. In this case, the beneficial environmental impact of decreasing commodity
output procurement volume after commercialization, the third term in (5), outweighs the
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other three effects which are harmful to the environment.
We close this section with an important remark. Recall from Proposition 3 that the value
of biomass commercialization is characterized based on three different contract procurement
regions (i.e., β <
¯
β,
¯
β ≤ β < β¯, and β ≥ β¯). In a particular region because the contract
volumes before and after commercialization are independent of β, so is ∆ECE(β), and thus,
so are the biomass selling emission intensity thresholds and the biomass demand threshold
given in Proposition 5. However, ∆ECE(β) and these thresholds vary across the contract
procurement regions. We use this observation in the next section.
4.3 Impact of Biomass Market Characteristics
We now conduct sensitivity analyses to study the effects of biomass demand (D2) and
biomass price (p2) on the change in total expected carbon emissions after commercialization
∆ECE(β). We say that a change in D2 or p2 is environmentally superior (inferior) when
it leads to a decrease (increase) in ∆ECE(β). These sensitivity analyses are useful in
understanding the environmental consequences of recently implemented government policies
(as discussed in the Introduction) that have been devised based on economic consequences.
Although we carry out the sensitivity analyses for any β, for illustration purposes, we
focus on the β <
¯
β case where the firm contracts up to processing capacity K0 before and
after commercialization. In this case, ∆ECE(β) in (5) can be characterized as follows:4
∆ECE(β) =
(
es2 − el2
)
D2 E
[
χ
(
S˜1 >
c0 − a2p2
a1
)]
(6)
+
(
eb0 + e
p
0 + a3e
r
3 + a2e
l
2 + a1e
s
1
) D2
a2
E
[
χ
(
c0 − a2p2
a1
< S˜1 ≤ c0
a1
)]
−
(
eb1 + e
s
1
)
min
(
D1, a1
D2
a2
)
E
[
χ
(
c0 − a2p2
a1
< S˜1 ≤ c0
a1
)
χ(S˜1 ≤ p1)
]
.
The first term in (6) denotes the expected emissions resulting from using available waste of
D2 units, which would go to landfill, to substitute fossil fuel in energy production (which
happens on the spot day when processing is profitable after commercialization; that is,
a1S1 + a2p2 > c0). The second term denotes the expected emissions associated with
the additional input processing volume D2/a2 after commercialization (which happens on
the spot day when processing becomes profitable only after commercialization; that is,
a1S1 + a2p2 > c0 ≥ a1S1). The last term denotes the expected emissions associated with
4We relegate the details of this characterization and the characterizations of ∆ECE(β) for the other two
cases (i.e.,
¯
β ≤ β < β¯ and β ≥ β¯) to Section B of the online appendix.
23
the decline in the commodity output spot procurement volume (that is used to satisfy
output demand D1) after commercialization as result of the additional output production
volume a1D2/a2 (which happens on the spot day when processing becomes profitable only
after commercialization and when it is profitable satisfy the output demand from spot
procurement; that is, p1 ≥ S1).
Proposition 7 examines the impact of biomass demand D2 on ∆ECE(β).
Proposition 7 Let es2 and e
s
2 as defined in Proposition 5. (i) If e
s
2 ≤ es2, then ∂∆ECE(β)/∂D2 <
0; (ii) if es2 ≥ es2, then ∂∆ECE(β)/∂D2 ≥ 0; (iii) if es2 < es2 < es2, then ∂∆ECE(β)/∂D2 <
0 for D2 < a2D1/a1 and ∂∆ECE(β)/∂D2 > 0 for a2D1/a1 ≤ D2 < a2K0.
It follows from (6) that increasing D2 has a harmful (beneficial) effect on the environment
when es2 > (<)e
l
2 because it increases (decreases) the expected emissions resulting from us-
ing available waste. At the same time, it has a harmful effect on the environment because it
increases the expected emissions associated with the additional processing volume. Finally,
increasing D2 decreases the expected emissions associated with the decline in the commod-
ity output spot procurement volume, which is beneficial for the environment, only when
D2 < a2D1/a1; otherwise, it does not affect these emissions. When the biomass selling emis-
sion intensity es2 is lower than e
s
2 (which is smaller than e
l
2 as shown in Proposition 6), the
beneficial effect associated with using available waste outweighs the harmful effect associ-
ated with increasing processing volume without considering the beneficial effect associated
with the decline in output spot procurement. As es2 increases, the latter effect becomes
consequential. In particular, when es2 < e
s
2 < e
s
2, increasing D2 continues to be environ-
mentally superior as long as the latter beneficial effect is relevant (i.e., for D2 < a2D1/a1);
otherwise, increasing D2 becomes environmentally inferior. When e
s
2 further increases (i.e.,
es2 ≥ es2), the beneficial effect associated with the decline in output spot procurement is al-
ways dominated by the combined effects of emissions associated with using available waste
and increasing processing volume outweigh, and increasing D2 is environmentally inferior.
We next examine how changing biomass price p2 impacts the environmental assessment
of biomass commercialization. To avoid uninteresting cases, we restrict our attention to
p2 < c0/a2 range; that is, biomass revenue itself is not sufficient to justify processing.
5
5Considering p2 ≥ c0/a2 leads to uninteresting cases. For example, as can be observed from (6), because
output spot price S˜1 is assumed to have a positive support, ∆ECE(β) for β <
¯
β is independent of p2.
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Proposition 8 Assume p2 < c0/a2 and let eˆ
.
= eb0 + e
p
0 + a3e
r
3 + a2e
l
2 + a1e
s
1 > 0. There
exist two thresholds es
2
.
= el2 − eˆa2 and e
s
2 with e
s
2
≤ es2 such that (i) if es2 ≤ es2, then
∂∆ECE(β)/∂p2 < 0; (ii) if e
s
2 ≥ es2, then ∂∆ECE(β)/∂p2 ≥ 0; (iii) if es2 < es2 < e
s
2,
then there exists a unique D¯2(e
s
2) > a2D1/a1 such that ∂∆ECE(β)/∂p2 ≤ 0 for D2 ≤
min(D¯2(e
s
2), a2K0), and ∂∆ECE(β)/∂p2 > 0 for min(D¯2(e
s
2), a2K0) < D2 ≤ a2K0.
Proposition 8 demonstrates that the impact of biomass price p2 is structurally similar to the
impact of biomass demand D2. In particular, when biomass selling emission intensity e
s
2 is
lower than the threshold es
2
(which is also lower than el2), increasing p2 is environmentally
superior. When es2 is higher than the threshold e
s
2, increasing p2 is environmentally inferior.
Otherwise (i.e., es
2
< es2 < e
s
2), increasing p2 is environmentally superior (inferior) when
biomass demand is lower (higher) than D¯2(e
s
2).
6 Although the emission intensity thresholds
and the biomass demand threshold are different from the ones in Proposition 7, the intuition
behind the characterization of these thresholds is similar. This is because, as can be observed
from (6), a higher p2 affects the emission terms in the same direction with a higher D2.
It is easy to establish from Proposition 3 that a higher biomass demand or price always
increases the value of biomass commercialization ∆V (β). Propositions 7 and 8 demonstrate
that a change that is economically beneficial is not necessarily beneficial for the environment.
5 Numerical Analysis: Application to the Palm Industry
In this section, we discuss an application of our model in the context of a palm oil mill
processing fresh fruit palm bunches (FFB) to produce crude palm oil (CPO) while gen-
erating palm kernel shell (PKS) as organic waste. We calibrate our model parameters to
represent a typical palm oil mill in Malaysia selling its PKS to a power plant in Japan. We
relegate the description of data and calibration used for our numerical experiments to §A
of the online appendix. Using these experiments, we examine the effect of spot price un-
certainty on the value of PKS commercialization and the environmental assessment of PKS
commercialization where PKS is used for substituting coal or liquified natural gas (LNG).
Throughout this section, x´ denotes the calibrated value for parameter x, “RM” denotes
Malaysian ringgit (currency), “mt” denotes metric ton (equal to 1,000 kg), and “CO2”
denotes carbon dioxide which we use for measuring carbon emissions. Table 2 summarizes
the calibrated parameter values representing the baseline scenario used in our numerical
6We can also prove that the threshold D¯2(e
s
2) (convexly) decreases in e
s
2.
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experiments.7 We use β´ =
¯
β−0.5%µ´0 = 98.25%µ´0, β´ = (
¯
β+ β¯)/2 = 99.19%µ´0, and β´ = µ´0
to represent the low (β <
¯
β), moderate (
¯
β ≤ β < β¯), and high (β ≥ β¯) contract cost cases
where
¯
β and β¯ are calculated based on the calibrated values.
Notation Description Value
µ´0, µ´1 Means of FFB and CPO spot prices 498.77, 2465.20 RM
σ´0, σ´1 Standard deviations of FFB and CPO spot prices 58.60, 255.04 RM
ρ´ Correlation between FFB and CPO spot prices 0.745
c´0
Unit processing cost −39.47 RM/mt
(normalized by other by-product revenues)
K´0 Processing capacity 56688.06 mt
a´1, a´2 Production yields of CPO, PKS, and residues 19.77%, 5.65%
D´1 CPO demand 5379.47 mt
p´1, p´2 CPO and PKS prices for demand sales 2433.25, 476.40 RM/mt
e´b0 FFB buying emission intensity 89.25 kg CO2/mt
e´p0 Processing emission intensity 12.49 kg CO2/mt
a´3e´
r
3 Effective residue emission intensity 209.69 kg CO2/mt
e´l2 PKS landfill emission intensity 1470.00 kg CO2/mt
e´s2 PKS selling emission intensity
151.23 kg CO2/mt, replacing coal
652.28 kg CO2/mt, replacing LNG
e´s1 CPO selling emission intensity 216.82 kg CO2/mt
e´b1 CPO buying emission intensity 1990.25 kg CO2/mt
Table 2: Description of the Baseline Scenario Used in Our Numerical Experiments. FFB
and CPO spot prices are bivariate normally distributed.
We first examine the effects of FFB and CPO spot price variabilities (σ0 and σ1, re-
spectively) and spot price correlation (ρ) on the value of PKS commercialization ∆V (β).
Because ∆V (β) = M(β)D2 and the influence of these parameters is through their impact
on the expected PKS margin M(β), Figure 2 plots the effects of changing ρ (panel a), σ0
(panel b), and σ1 (panel c) on M(β)—which is presented as the percentage of the PKS
price p2—in our baseline scenario. Because our model calibration satisfies the assumptions
made in §3.4—that is, bivariate Normal distribution of (S˜0, S˜1) with a´1µ´1 > c´0 + µ´0 and
ρ´ > 0—we compare our numerical results with the analytical sensitivity results presented
in Proposition 4. Our numerical experiments complement the analytical sensitivity analy-
ses in the following two ways. First, they focus on global sensitivity analyses which allow
for change in the optimal contracting decisions before and after commercialization. For
7There is no D´2 because our results can be presented without using a calibrated value for biomass demand.
26
example, as illustrated by dash-dotted line in panel a of Figure 2, when the firm is in the
moderate contract cost region (
¯
β < β < β¯) with the calibrated value of ρ´ (represented by
•), as ρ increases (decreases) there is a transition to low (high) contract cost region β <
¯
β
(β > β¯). These transitions occur because
¯
β and β¯ depend on ρ. Second, our numerical
experiments examine the effect of σ1 for an extended range in the moderate contract cost
case; Proposition 4 proves this effect only for σ1 ≤ σ0ρ/a1. In particular, panel c illustrates
that M(β) first increases then decreases in σ1 where the turning point is larger than σ0ρ/a1.
This behavior is structurally the same with the high contract cost case. The general insights
from Figure 2 parallel the ones from Proposition 4: the value of PKS commercialization
increases in spot price correlation but increases in (FFB or CPO) spot price variability only
when this variability is low; otherwise, the value decreases in spot price variability.
We next investigate under what conditions a typical palm oil mill in Malaysia can
justifiably claim that commercializing its PKS is environmentally beneficial when PKS is
used for substituting coal or LNG in the power plant in Japan. To this end, we compute the
biomass selling emission intensity thresholds es2 and e
s
2, and the biomass demand threshold
D¯2(e
s
2) (as characterized in Proposition 5) in our baseline scenario for the low (β <
¯
β),
moderate (
¯
β ≤ β < β¯), and high (β ≥ β¯) contract cost cases. Figure 3 illustrates these
thresholds for each case where D¯2(e
s
2) is presented as a percentage of a2K0, processing
capacity required to satisfy biomass demand, which is no greater than 100% because of our
assumption D2 ≤ a2K0. In each panel the calibrated landfill emission intensity and biomass
selling emission intensity with coal (LNG) as the fuel substitute are depicted by ? and •
(◦), respectively. Because both biomass selling emission intensities are less than the landfill
emission intensity, based on the common perception in practice (which does not consider the
changes in operational decisions after commercialization) the palm oil mill would conclude
that commercializing its PKS is environmentally beneficial regardless of the fuel substitute.
We observe from panel a that when the contract cost is low, es2 = e
s
2 = e´
l
2 and the en-
vironmental assessment is consistent with the common perception in practice. In this case,
the mill contracts up to K0 before and after commercialization, and input spot procurement
is never used. Because Pr
(
S˜1 >
c´0
a´1
)
≈ 1 in the baseline scenario; that is, processing is al-
ways profitable on the spot day in the absence of PKS revenue, PKS commercialization does
not affect the processing volume. Therefore, as follows from (6), ∆ECE(β) ≈ (es2 − el2)D2
and PKS commercialization is environmentally beneficial regardless of the fuel substitute
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Figure 2: Effects of Spot Price Correlation ρ (Panel a), FFB Spot Price Variability σ0 (Panel
b), and CPO Spot Price Variability σ1 (Panel c) on the Expected PKS Margin M(β) as a
Percentage of PKS Price p2 in the Baseline Scenario: In panel a, ρ ∈ [0.545, 0.945] evenly-
spaced around the baseline value ρ´ = 0.745 with a step size of 0.001 whereas in panel b
(panel c), σ0(σ1) ∈ [−50%, 50%] of the baseline value σ´0 = 58.60 (σ´1 = 255.04) with 0.5%
increments. In the three panels, baseline scenario for low, moderate, and high contract
cost cases are indicated by • aligned horizontally with the baseline value. In panel b (c), ∗
denotes the σ0 (σ1) level in which M(β) attains its maximum wherever applicable.
because e´s2 < e´
l
2. Panel b (c) illustrates that when the contract cost is moderate (high),
es2 < e
s
2 < e´
l
2 and the environmental assessment may not be consistent with the common
perception in practice.8 For illustration, we focus on the moderate contract cost case which
is more representative of a typical palm oil mill because a mixture of contract and input
spot procurement is used. In this case (as observed from panel b), the palm oil mill can jus-
tifiably claim that commercializing its PKS to substitute coal is environmentally beneficial
only when biomass demand is smaller than a level that is associated with approximately
82% processing capacity utilization. Interestingly, when PKS is used for substituting LNG,
which is a cleaner energy source, PKS commercialization becomes environmentally harm-
8In this case, processing is not always profitable on the spot day in the absence of PKS revenue because
input spot procurement is used, and thus, PKS commercialization increases the processing volume.
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Figure 3: The Environmental Assessment of PKS Commercialization for the Low (Panel a),
Moderate (Panel b), and High (Panel c) Contract Cost Cases: In each panel, • (◦) represents
the calibrated biomass selling mission intensity es2 when PKS is used for substituting coal
(LNG) and ? represents the calibrated landfill emission intensity. PKS commercialization
is environmentally beneficial when es2 ≤ es2 or es2 < es2 < es2 and D2 < min(D¯2(es2), a2K0).
ful regardless of the biomass demand. These results demonstrate that a typical mill may
mistakenly think that commercializing its PKS is environmentally beneficial when it is not.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the economic and environmental implications of biomass commercialization—
that is, converting organic waste into a saleable product—from the perspective of agricul-
tural processing firms by incorporating several unique operational features of these firms.
On the economic implications, we characterize the value of biomass commercialization and
provide insights on how the spot price uncertainty (input and output price variability and
correlation) shapes this value. On the environmental implications, we characterize the
carbon emission resulting from biomass commercialization and provide guidance on when
processors can justifiably claim that commercializing their biomass is environmentally ben-
eficial. We also provide insights on how biomass market characteristics affect this envi-
ronmental assessment. As summarized in the Introduction, our findings have important
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practical implications that are of relevance to both agri-processors and policy makers.
In our computational study throughout §5, we calibrated our model to represent a
typical palm oil mill in Malaysia. We expect our insights to continue to hold for a palm
oil mill in another location (e.g., Indonesia). Because coconut processing and sugarcane
processing share common characteristics with the palm processing—for instance, both input
and output are commodities, and processing residue is commercialized as biomass—we
expect the majority of our findings to be valid for coconut and sugar industries as well.
That being said, future research is still needed to verify this conjecture by using our paper’s
methodology to calibrate the model based on a different agricultural industry.
Relaxing the assumptions made about processing environment gives rise to a number of
interesting areas for future research. First, we (implicitly) assume that the processor does
not participate in the input spot resale market as a part of its procurement strategy. Second,
we normalize the exercise cost of quantity flexibility procurement contract to zero. The
availability of spot resale (a positive exercise price) increases (decreases) the profitability
before and after biomass commercialization but it is not clear how it would affect the
value of commercialization. Finally, based on our interactions with a coconut processor,
we assume a fixed-price fixed-volume sales contract for the biomass. Examining the effect
of different sales contract forms on our results would be an interesting avenue for future
research. For example, the sales contract can be in the form of an index-based contract
(Goel and Tanrisever 2017) where the unit biomass price includes a fixed component and a
variable component that is indexed on the spot price of the main output.
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